Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Utah v. Cruz : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kim Rilling; Rilling & Associates; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Linda Luinstra; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee; Ann Wasserman.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Cruz, No. 900162 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2555

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF

r

c

KrU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO

S

Ar

~~

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

In the Interest of:
J. C., a person under
eighteen years of age

Case No. 900162-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.

Priority No. 4

Juanita Cruz,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE OLOF A. JOHANSSON, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Utah Attorney General
LINDA LUINSTRA (2012)
Assistant Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellee
ANN WASSERMAN
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Guardian Ad Litem
KIM RILLINv
Rilling & Associates
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of:
J. C., a person under
eighteen years of age

Case No. 900162-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.

Priority No. 4

Juanita Cruz,

:

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE OLOF A. JOHANSSON, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Utah Attorney General
LINDA LUINSTRA (2012)
Assistant Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellee
ANN WASSERMAN
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Guardian Ad Litem
KIM RILLING
Rilling & Associates
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENTS:
POINT I

POINT II

CONCLUSION

BASED UPON OVERWHELMING, PROPERLY
ADMITTED EVIDENCE, THE FINDINGS AND
ORDER WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
A. Clear and Convincing Admissible
Evidence Supported the Trial Court's
Finding of Abandonment and Order
Terminating Appellant's Parental
Rights

7

B. Other Findings Challenged by
Appellant Were Supported By
Competent Evidence

14

THE JUVENILE COURT'S ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT WAS AT WORST
HARMLESS ERROR

16

7

18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page(s)
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.f 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984)

15

In Interest of J.CO v. Anderson, 734 P.2d 458
(Utah 1987)

8, 10, 11, 12

In Interest of S.R., 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987)

8

In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983)

10, 11

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982)

7, 13

Matter of Adoption of Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (Utah 1978)

12

Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977)

10

State in Interest of C.Y v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251
(Utah App. 1988)
16, 17
State in Interest of J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234
(Utah App. 1988)
1, 8, 9, 11, 13
State in Interest of S.J., 576 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1978)
15, 17, 18
State in Interest of Summers Children v. Wulffenstein,
560 P.2d 331

11

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-48(l) (b) (1953)

...8

Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-47 (1953)

11

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a)

10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of:
J. C., a person under
eighteen years of age

i

Case No. 900162-CA

:

Priority No. 4

Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
Juanita Cruz,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2a-3(2)(c) and 78-3a-51 (1953),
as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Juvenile Court's decision to terminate

the parental rights of appellant in her child J.C. on the ground
of abandonment was properly supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

The standard of review for a decision involving

termination of parental rights was set forth in State in Interest
of J.R.T. v. Timperly:

"The decision ... will be disturbed on

review only if the findings are clearly erroneous, i.e. if the
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence.M
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750 P.2d

1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1988).
2.

See also Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52 (a).

Whether, even if the evidence to which appellant

objects had been excluded, the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the Juvenile Court's Findings and Order.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE
1.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-48 (1953) provides in relevant part:
(l)The court may decree a termination of all
parental rights with respect to one or both
parents if the court finds either (a), (b),
(c), or (d) as follows:
...

(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned
the child. It is prima facie evidence of
abandonment that the parent or parents,
although having legal custody of the child,
have surrendered physical custody of the
child, and for a period of six months
following the surrender have not manifested
to the child or the person having the
physical custody of the child a firm
intention to resume physical custody or to
make arrangements for the care of the child.
2.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part:
...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 15, 1989, the State of Utah filed a
petition in the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake City
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seeking the termination of the parental rights of Juanita Cruz in
her minor child J.C.

The matter came before the Honorable Olof

A. Johansson in a hearing held January 26, 1990•

The Court filed

its Findings and Order terminating the mother's parental rights
on the grounds of abandonment on February 15, 1990. The mother
sought review of the Findings and Order, and filed a notice of
appeal on March 16, 1990. A docketing statement was filed April
9, 1990.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the termination of Juanita Cruz's
parental rights in her natural child J.C, who at the time of the
termination hearing was 10 years old.

J.C. is mentally retarded

and has a hearing disability.
At the termination hearing, the State called as a
witness Cathy Haderlie, a social worker with the Utah Division of
Family Services (DFS), who testified that she had been J.C.'s
case worker for nearly two years.

Tr. at 14, 15.

Since J.C. had

been in State custody prior to her involvement with his case, Ms.
Haderlie derived some of the information to which she testified
from J.C.'s DFS case file. Ms. Cruz's attorney noted a
continuing objection to this testimony on the grounds that it was
hearsay.

The court admitted the testimony under Utah Rule of

Evidence 803 (6). The evidence to which Ms. Cruz objected
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included testimony that J.C. came into state custody in 1984, and
that his mother had visited with J.C. eight times in 1986 and
three times in 1987.

Tr. at 9#11.

In addition she testified as

to J.C.'s behavioral problems as documented by his previous case
workers.

Tr. at 13.

She also testified that Juanita Cruz failed

to complete three treatment plans ordered by the same juvenile
court in 1986-87.

Tr. at 14-15. At the request of the State's

attorney, the judge took judicial notice of the treatment plans,
which appeared in the court file.

Tr. at 14-15.

In addition to Ms. Haderlie's testimony, the state
submitted as an exhibit a compilation prepared by Ms. Haderlie of
relevant information in J.C.'s DFS file.

See Exhibit I. Ms.

Cruz's attorney objected to the reference in the exhibit to a
conversation between a Child Protective Services worker and an
informant regarding J.C. and his mother.

The reference was

stricken from the document, and the judge admitted the exhibit
with no further objections from Ms. Cruz's attorney.

Tr. at 22-

25.
Besides the evidence Ms. Cruz claims was erroneously
admitted, Ms. Haderlie offered considerable testimony regarding
her personal observations.

She told the court that during the

time she had been involved in the case, Juanita Cruz had not
visited her son or sent him any gifts, cards or other
correspondence, that she contributed nothing to his financial
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support, that she made no inquiries concerning his health# and
that she did not even know how old he was.

Tr. at 15, 18, 16.

She testified that there was no parent-child bond between J.C.
and his mother, and that Ms. Cruz's lack of affirmative
involvement with J.C. was very atypical even among parents of
children in State custody.

Tr. at 22. As to visitation, she

testified that Ms. Cruz called her in April 1989 to ask if she
could see J.C.

Ms. Haderlie said she denied the request because

she felt a visit would not be in J.C.'s best interest, inasmuch
as he had been placed in a foster home three days previously and
was going through a major adjustment period.

Tr. at 17.

According to Ms. Haderlie, Ms. Cruz called her in May 1989 to ask
for the name of a lawyer, and again in November to express anger
over having received a summons in connection with the State's
petition to terminate her parental rights.

I^i. Ms. Haderlie

testified that at the time of the hearing, J.C. had been in a
stable foster home for nine months, that his foster parents had
worked professionally with the mentally handicapped and possessed
skills necessary to deal with J.C.'s disabilities, and that the
family loved him and was anxious to adopt him.
19.

Tr. at 28, 18,

In addition she stated that according to her observations,

J.C.'s speech and behavioral problems had improved dramatically
over the previous year.

Tr. at 13-14.
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Ms. Cruz's own testimony verified that she had not
visited with J.C. since 1987. Tr. at 42.

She said that DFS

workers repeatedly told her that she could not visit J.C.

Id.

When asked why she had not sent J.C. any gifts or cards, she
maintained that DFS prevented her.

Tr. at 47-48.

to correctly recall J.C.'s birthdate.

She was unable

Tr. at 47. Although at

one point she stated that she had learned some sign language in
order to be able to communicate with J.C, she was unable to
demonstrate any proficiency.

Tr. at 46-47.

She also verified

that she had not completed the court-ordered treatment plans.
Tr. at 45.

No other witnesses were called on Ms. Cruz's behalf.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although Ms. Cruz contends that the trial court had
insufficient evidence to support its findings, the record is
clear that the elements of abandonment were established by
properly admitted testimony,

The facts which Ms. Cruz

characterizes as hearsay were in fact within the personal
knowledge of the witnesses, including Ms. Cruz, or were otherwise
properly before the court.

The evidence was clear and convincing

both to create the statutory presumption of abandonment and to
meet the test for abandonment set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court.
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However, even if the evidence to which Ms. Cruz
specifically objects had been erroneously admitted, the juvenile
court's decision should nevertheless be upheld under the harmless
error rule, since there was no reasonable likelihood that the
court's decision to terminate Ms. Cruz's parental rights would
have been any different without the challenged evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BASED UPON OVERWHELMING, PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE,
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER WERE NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
A. Clear and Convincing Admissible Evidence Supported the Trial
Court's Finding of Abandonment and Order Terminating
Appellant's Parental Rights•
It is undisputed that, as Ms, Cruz points out, the
relationship between parent and child is a fundamental right
protected by both the United States and Utah Constitutions.
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (1977).

See

However, that right is not

without limits, especially where the conduct of parents is
seriously detrimental to children.

As the Utah Supreme Court has

observed, "[W]e are mindful that deprivation of parental rights
is drastic action.

Yet at the same time the lives and futures of

[children] are in limbo, and their interests, too, must be
considered and hopefully some permanency and stability found for
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them."

In Interest of S.R. and B.R. v. G.R., 735 P.2d 53, 57

(1987).
Utah statutes provide for the termination of parental
rights if the juvenile court finds that a parent has abandoned
her child.

According to Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-48 (l)(b) :

It is prima facie evidence of abandonment
that the parent or parents, although having
legal custody of the child, have surrendered
physical custody of the child, and for a
period of six months following the surrender
have not manifested to the child or to the
person having the physical custody of the
child a firm intention to resume physical
custody or to make arrangements for the care
of the child.
Under the statute, the party seeking termination—in
this case, the State—needs only to establish that a prima facie
case exists to create a presumption of abandonment.
then shifts to the parent to rebut that presumption.
Interest of J.CO. v. Anderson,

The burden
See State in

734 P.2d 458 (Utah 1987); State

in Interest of J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Ut. App.
1988).
In Interest of J.CO., the parents had left their
children in the custody of other families for approximately two
years.

Although they visited the children on rare occasions and

at one point expressed interest in regaining custody, the trial
court nevertheless held that they had abandoned the children.

The

Utah Supreme Court uph€*ld the decision, noting that "there is no
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evidence upon which the trial judge could rely, except the
Andersons' assertions that they have not abandoned the children,
in holding that the prima facie evidence of abandonment had been
rebutted."

Jki. at 462.

Similarly, in Timperly, the father was

unable to satisfactorily account for his failure to visit or
communicate with his children, whom he had left in state foster
care for fifteen months. According to the Utah Court of Appeals,
"These facts, under the statute, constitute prima facie evidence
of abandonment.

In order to rebut the presumption of abandonment,

the duty was upon appellant to manifest a firm intention to resume
physical custody of, or make arrangements for the care of, J.R.T.
within the six month period."

Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1237.

As to the instant case, Ms. Cruz's own testimony that
she had not visited or otherwise communicated with J.C. since
1987, plus Ms. Haderlie's unchallenged, properly admitted
testimony regarding her experiences as J.C.'s case worker,
establish clearly the presumption of abandonment. However, the
presumption was not rebutted by Ms. Cruz. While it is conceded
that Ms. Cruz expressed interest in seeing J.C. in April 1989, she
was unable to explain her long period of inaction (which greatly
exceeded the six months required under the statute) to the judge's
satisfaction.

Although Ms.Cruz testified that DFS denied her any

opportunity to visit or communicate with her child, the judge's
findings indicate that he simply did not find her testimony
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credible.

See Findings and Order at 3.

prerogative as the trier of fact.

This was clearly his

In In re J. Children, the Utah

Supreme Court noted that since the trial court hears the evidence
in person, it occupies an advantaged position.

Because of this,

the court observed, the trial court is in the best position to
judge the credibility of witnesses.

664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1983).

See also Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) specifically acknowledges that
"due regard shall be given to the trial court to judge the
credibility of witnesses."
It is also clear that Ms. Cruz's two requests for
visitation in two years hardly constitute a manifestation of firm
intent to resume physical custody or make arrangements for a
child's care.

See, e.g., Interest of J.CO.

In Ms. Cruz's case,

the court was also negatively impressed with the fact that, in
spite of her testimony, Ms. Cruz had failed to develop sign
language skills with which to communicate with J.C.
and Order at 3.

See Findings

Ms. Cruz herself testified as to her failure to

complete the treatment plans designed to reunite her with J.C.
Tr. at 45.

These facts provide clear and convincing evidence that

at no time did Ms. Cruz manifest a firm intent to resume physical
custody of J.C. or to make arrangements for his care.

Although in

her brief Ms. Cruz argties at some length that DFS erred in denying
her requests for visitation, it is a fact that at any time she
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could have sought review of the agency's decision.

See, e.g. Utah

Code Ann. S 48-3a-47 (1953) (providing that a parent may petition
the juvenile court for change or modification of a custody decree
upon a change in circumstances). In any case, however, this
appeal deals with whether the juvenile court's findings regarding
J.C.'s abandonment and order of termination were clearly
erroneous.

This court is therefore not the place to raise an

issue regarding the adequacy or fairness of the agency's action.
In addition to the statutory presumption of
abandonment, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to
be used in determining whether a parent has abandoned a child.

In

State in Interest of Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, the Court
held that to terminate parental rights, a court must determine (1)
whether the parent's conduct has evidenced a conscious disregard
for her parental obligations, and (2) whether that disregard has
led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship.
331, 334 (1977).

560 P.2d

According to the Court, abandonment may be

proven objectively from the actions of the parent as well as from
the parent's expressions of subjective intent.

See Interest of

J.CO., 734 P.2d at 462. The Court has also noted that,
••Abandonment can only result from inaction or a course of conduct
for which the parent is personally responsible."
Children, 664 P.2d at 1159.

-11-

See In re J.

In Interest of J.C.O., the Court held that the lower
court's finding of conscious disregard and subsequent destruction
of the parent child relationship was supported by evidence that
the parents had never provided financially for their children, and
that they had taken only a superficial interest in their
children's welfare•

W

at 462.

See also State in Interest of

J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d L234 (Ut. App. 1988).

Similarly, in

Matter of Adoption of Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (1978), the Court
upheld the termination of a mother's parental rights on evidence
that she had visited her children only five or six times in four
years, that she had sent no gifts, letters, or communications to
her children on Christmas or their birthdays, and had made no
phone calls or other attempts to contact them.
In the instant case, even without the evidence
appellant claims was inadmissible hearsay, the record contains
abundant evidence from which the juvenile court could have found
abandonment.

Ms. Cruz herself testified that she had not seen

J.C. since 1987, and that she had not sent him birthday or
Christmas cards.

While she maintained that she had made attempts

to contact J.C. but had been prevented from doing so, the court
found her testimony unpersuasive.

See Findings and Order at 3.

Ms. Haderlie, testifying from her own observations, stated that
Ms. Cruz did not contribute to J.C's support, that she never
inquired about his health, that there was no parent-child bond
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between her and J.C., and that she manifested an unusual lack of
affirmative involvement with J.C.

These facts provide obvious

support for the conclusion that Ms. Cruz consciously disregarded
her parental obligations.

In short, the record indicates a clear

and convincing evidentiary basis for the judge's finding that Ms.
Cruz's conduct toward the boy was a substantial departure from
normal parental behavior, and that her conduct led to a breakdown
of the child-parent relationship.

See Findings and Order at 3.

According to the Utah Supreme Court, an additional
consideration in the decision to terminate parental rights is the
best interest of the child.

See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (1982);

Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1238. The Timperly court wrote:
The second prong of the objective abandonment
test, whether the parental disregard led to
the destruction of the parent-child
relationship, satisfies the need separately
to consider the best interest of the child.
If the parent-child relationship has been
destroyed by the parent's conduct, or lack of
conduct, it is usually in the best interest
of the child to terminate that relationship
and allow the child an opportunity to
establish a meaningful relationship with
loving, responsible parents.
Id. at 1238.
In the instant case, as in Timperly# the child has made
considerable progress with his foster family, who love him and
wish to adopt him.

See id. at 1238-39. Here, the juvenile court

judge's determination that J.C.'s best interests required
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termination of his natural mother's parental rights was based upon
Ms. Haderlie's testimony regarding J.C's improvement while in the
care of his foster family.

These observations were derived from

Ms. Haderlie's own experience as J.C's case worker, and, again,
constitute clear and convincing evidence.

B.

Other Findings Challenged by Appellant Were Supported By
Competent Evidence.
Appellant contends that certain other findings of the

trial court were not supported by properly admitted evidence.
First, she claims that there was no competent evidence to
establish the chronology of events surrounding J.C's placement
with DFS.

Second, she maintains that there was only hearsay

testimony to support the judge's finding that Ms. Cruz failed to
comply with the court-ordered treatment plans.

Finally, she

argues that no competent evidence was admitted regarding J.C's
flinching and bedwetting following visitation with his mother.
With regard to the evidence dealing with J.C's
flinching and bedwetting, that information was included in the
exhibit prepared by Ms. Haderlie.

See Exhibit I.

Ms. Cruz's

attorney failed to make a specific hearsay objection to that
exhibit as a whole although she had ample opportunity to do so,
Ms. Cruz did object to one sentence in the exhibit without
specifying grounds for the objection, and the judge deleted the
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sentence.

However, when he specifically asked her whether she had

any further objections, she replied that she did not.

Tr. at 25.

The law is well established that a party must make a timely,
specific objection in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See,
e.g., Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah
1984).
Ms. Cruz contends that the judge erred in referring to
J.C's placement with Topham's Tiny Tots in 1982 and his subsequent
placement with the State. However, as the court noted, the
information was already part of the child's court record.
7.

Tr. at

J.C. had come before the court previously, and its

jurisdiction over him was continuing.
40 (1953).
records.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-

In addition, a court may take notice of its own
In

Interest of S.J.—also a termination case—the Utah

Supreme Court wrote:
The evidence was not hearsay because the
witness was testifying as to evidence already
part of the record in a prior proceeding in
this case, which resulted in the placement of
the child in a foster home. The court took
judicial notice of the prior proceeding,
which he may do under U.C.A. 78-25-1(3) as
interpreted in State v. Bates [citation
omitted].
576 P.2d at 1283. The introduction of Ms. Haderlie's testimony
regarding how J.C. came to be in State foster care was therefore
properly admitted.
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As to Ms, Cruz's failure to comply with the treatment
plans, Ms. Cruz herself acknowledged her failure to complete the
plans in the following statement: "I'll do anything that I need
to, learn all the—what I wanted, I never denied none of those
treatment plans, you know I wanted to do them and stuff, but then
ladies come, you know, and then start fading away."

Tr. at 46.

In light of Ms. Cruz's admission, the court's finding was not
clearly erroneous, but was properly supported.

POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT'S ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT
WAS AT WORST HARMLESS ERROR.
As the record in this case reveals, ample evidence was
presented at the hearing to justify the trial judge's finding that
Ms. Cruz abandoned J.C., even if evidence taken from J.C.'s DFS
files had been excluded.

That being the case, even if an error in

admitting the evidence had been made, the judge's decision shoxild
be left undisturbed under the harmless error rule.
A statement of the harmless error rule was given by the
Utah Court of Appeals in State in Interest of C.Y. v. Yates;
The pivotal question is whether the error
resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant
reversal of the termination order. An error
is prejudicial "only if a review of the
record persuades the [appellate] court that
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without the error there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant. ',f [citations omitted, emphasis
in original] A reasonable likelihood is Ma
probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. ... Therefore, we
must review the record and determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the
outcome of the termination hearing would have
been more favorable to [the appellant] had
the juvenile court not [erred].
• 'r
S.J.,

'

1988).

See also State I n Interest of
y

•

i Yates y the cc

he •] d

that the lower court's judgment terminating a father's parental
other properly admitted evidence
establishing

- same facts.

Yates, 765

_

*

^e

instant case, testimony given by Ms. Cruz demonstrated that she
li i Il i n I v ' l s i t € ::i 1 iej : ::: 1 i :i Il ::I i i x i

IIII: ore

• thai i 1: i

*

not sent him. letters, cards or gifts, ai iu could
birthdate.

*

had

remember IU.O

In addition, her inability to demonstrate simple

commuii i HI li; im (in!,, i in M,,! ij i'i

I iiihjur.ujt 1

(1 iJinnJ:„> i M H 1 i i I l i III i,i ir

I i h i i mm H I | ,

provided evidence that she had not complied with the treatment
plans

The judge's findings with regard

depend mi I he

mitt iiuiliin I inn

il

I,In1 t i l lie

but on Ms. Cruz's own testimony.

these matters did not
Ijnia. s j.l nJl <.• p
' "« , i d f j n r H ,

Hence, any error was harmless.

Under the harmless error rule, admission of the
evidence offered by Ms. Hacierlie dealuii I,J

i I li I IIH e x a c e i Iba I i in f

J.C's behavioral problems following visits with h i s mother failed
I - : ::reate unfair prp-judice. Given the great weight of

-17-

unchallenged testimony supporting the judge's finding of
abandonment, it is clear that there was no reasonable likelihood
that his decision would have been different in the absence of this
evidence•

The appellant in Interest of S.J* made a claim of error

analogous to Ms. Cruz's, maintaining that the lower court had
erred in considering facts outside the record.

The Utah Supreme

Court responded that M[t]he petitions filed were to terminate
parental rights and the evidence admitted reasonably related to
appellant's [sic] ability to care for their children.

The

evidence is overwhelming that the parents cannot adequately
support and maintain their minor children and on the facts of this
case we feel compelled to sustain the court's order."

The clear

implication of this holding is that if competent evidence exists
to support a court's decision, the decision should stand. The
holding in Interest of S.J, has relevance to the instant case, in
that the record of Ms. Cruz's termination hearing contains
overwhelming evidence that she abandoned her child.

On that

basis, the trial court's decision should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The record in this case is replete with clear and
convincing evidence that Ms. Cruz abandoned her child.

While Ms.

Cruz asserts that very little competent evidence was presented at
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1

termination hearing • support the cour

findings, the

record demonstrates al

judge's

findings.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah
respectfully requests tna

: une

Juvenile Court to terminate Appellant's parental rights

her
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